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Adoption of new technology requires diversion of resources from direct production activities to 
learning/adjusting activities, which could reduce productivity temporarily. Focusing on the existence of such 
“learning cost”, we derive a simple model on the optimal timing for technology upgrading. This model 
suggests that a firm perceived to have better learning ability will show more frequent technology upgrading 
and higher market value even with possibly lower current profitability. The model predictions are supported by 
regression results from a panel data set of more than 1,000 companies in the US during the late 1980s and the 
early 1990s. Simulations based on an extended model reproduce the negative correlation between investment 
growth and TFP growth. 
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1. Introduction 
  In adopting a new technology, one must acquire a set of necessary skills and know-how in 
order to fully utilise the new technology and realise its maximum potential productivity gain.  This 
will involve acquiring a basic and then advanced understanding of the technology as well as gaining 
experience with the application of the technology in a particular business/industry context. Therefore, 
it takes time and effort for the potential productivity of the new technology to be fully realised. Such 
resources spent in adopting a new technology should be considered as part of the cost for technology 
adoption. This paper will call it as “learning cost”.  
  Consider, for example, technology upgrading from a typewriter to word processor. On the 
top of tangible costs for purchasing a personal computer, word processing software, a printer, floppy 
diskettes, etc., one will have to acquire the basic skills necessary to operate a personal computer. And 
yet, one will still have to become familiar with the word processing software. During the frustrating 
transition period, one might even lose a whole day’s work simply by making a computer error. It is 
not surprising that such intangible learning costs could make one’s productivity with the new word 
processor initially lower than that with the old typewriter. 
  The notion of learning cost is relevant at the organisation level as well. Consider a factory or 
a firm which has adopted a new technology. Just as with individual learning, it takes time and effort 
for an organisation to learn how to fully utilise a new technology and realise any productivity growth. 
For example, in order to most effectively implement a new technology, a new organisational structure 
might be called for.
1 Of course, restructuring an organisation requires tremendous time and effort. 
This restructuring can also be regarded as a part of organisational learning. 
  Recently, two “productivity puzzles” drew the attention of researchers in the Information 
Technology (IT) literature and in the studies of East Asian economic growth. The one was the 
slowdown in the US productivity growth during the 1980s in spite of the massive investment boom in 
IT capital.
2 The other was the unimpressive productivity growth from the impressive investment drive 
of “Newly Industrialising Economies” (NIEs) in East Asia.
3 These two cases seem to have interesting 
                                                      
1   For this point, see Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (1999), amongst others. 
2   For example, see the beginning paragraph of Oliner and Sichel [1994]: 
During the past 15 years, U.S. companies have poured billions of dollars into information technology. Yet, 
through the 1980s, many observers argue that these companies were not getting their money’s worth. As 
hard as analysts scoured the numbers, they could not show that computing equipment contributed much to 
productivity growth, leading to Robert Solow’s famous quip that “you can see the computer age everywhere 
but in the productivity statistics.” 
3   See Young [1995]. He concludes: 
While the growth of output and manufacturing exports in the newly industrializing countries of East Asia is 
virtually unprecedented, the growth of total factor productivity in these economies is not.  
  2common aspects. In both cases, there was a massive investment in sectors related to more advanced 
technology, but the return on such investments was marginal in terms of productivity. This paper 
focuses on “learning cost” in technology upgrading as a potential explanation of these two “puzzles”. 
  In the literature on technology and productivity, aggregate productivity slowdown is often 
attributed to required huge adjustment/learning costs in transition to a new technology regime. For 
example, David [1990] pointed out the case of pronounced productivity slowdown during 
electrification of the US and the UK over the period 1890-1913.  According to his comparison of the 
introduction of dynamos and that of computers, contemporary observers in 1900 might well have said 
that the electric dynamos were “everywhere but in the productivity statistics” like what Solow said 
about computers in 1987. Indeed, it took decades for large potential gains from factory electrification 
to be fully realised.
4 Greenwood and Yorukoglu [1997] offered a dynamic general equilibrium model 
based on the idea of vintage capital and investment in learning. Their model simulations supported 
their conclusion that “[a]t the dawn of an industrial revolution, the long-run advance in labor 
productivity temporarily pauses as economic agents undertake the (unmeasured) investment in 
information required to get new technologies operating closer to their full potential.”
5  
  This paper offers a simple model of optimal timing for technology upgrading, which 
considers both tangible upgrading cost and intangible learning cost.
6 While most previous studies 
focused on macroeconomic implications of a large-scale technological change (namely, “technology 
revolution” or advent of a new “General Purpose Technology (GPT)”), this paper pays attention to 
implications of firm-level heterogeneity under continuous introduction of newer frontier technologies 
with higher potential productivity. While previous studies based on a dynamic general equilibrium 
model had to rely on simulations, a minimalist model in this paper is very simple, and hence, basic 
questions can be answered analytically without relying on numerical methods. A deterministic 
learning equation hired in this paper, as well as the assumption of perfect foresight, might look too 
simplistic. In fact, however, such problem is common in the main body of the existing literature.
7 
                                                      
4   More generalised version of David’s insight from a historical perspective can be found in the notion of “General 
Purpose Technology (GPT)”. Some technologies such as steam engine, electricity, railway, and microelectronics  are 
regarded as GPTs in the sense that they are pervasively used as inputs by a wide and expanding range of sectors in 
the economy. In this approach, a technology revolution can be defined as the advent of a new GPT. See Bresnahan 
and Trajtenberg [1995], Helpman and Trajtenberg [1996], and Helpman and Rangel [1998], for example.   
5  Using simulations on a vintage capital model with conventional capital and information technology (IT) capital, 
Yorukoglu [1998] concluded that the marginal return of IT capital is underestimated by around 20% of its actual size. 
This conclusion is based on the simulation results that IT capital is associated with a strong learning-by-doing effect 
and that IT capital investment is mostly concentrated at the replacement dates. For a prototypical vintage capital 
model on the decision to replace old technologies with new ones, see Cooley, Greenwood, and Yorukoglu [1997]. 
6  According to back-of-the-envelope calculations by Jovanovic [1996], the costs of adopting new technologies are 20 
times as large as invention cost and may amount to 10% of GDP.  In our model, technology adoption costs consist of 
two parts, namely, tangible upgrading cost and intangible learning cost.  
7   Papers based on deterministic learning process includes Parente [1994], Greenwood and Yorukoglu [1996], Horstein 
and Krusell [1996], and Yorukoglu [1998]. Klenow [1998] incorporated uncertainty in demand side, but the learning 
process remained deterministic. Jovanovic and Nyarko [1995, 1996] based on Bayesian learning belong to a rare 
exception.
 
  3Predictions from models of deterministic learning process should be interpreted with special caution. 
In particular, the possibility of unsuccessful technology adoption cannot be easily incorporated in 
deterministic models or models with perfect foresight. 
  The overview of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. The model 
suggests that an optimising company with more frequent technology upgrading will tend to have 
higher market value even with lower current profitability. An empirical study using unbalanced panel 
data of more than 1,000 companies in the US from 1986 to 1995 supports this prediction (Section 3). 
Extending the scope from firm-level to industry-level, Section 4 estimates the magnitude of industry-
wide learning-by-doing effects using annual data on 15 sub-industries in the Japanese machinery 
manufacturing sector from 1955 to 1990. The results show that industry-wide learning-by-doing was 
strong in low-tech industries where technological change was relatively slow, while it was 
insignificant in high-tech industries which experienced rapid technological changes. In Section 5, it is 
widely observed in the US and Japanese manufacturing industries that TFP growth tends to decrease 
with faster capital accumulation. This basic pattern is not affected by various methods for measuring 
capital stock, or varying levels of aggregation. This intriguing pattern can be explained by the idea of 
learning cost in installing technology-embodied new capital better than by other competing stories. 
To support this argument, Section 6 extends the basic model to incorporate capital and to take 
aggregation from the individual producer’s level to the aggregated industry level. Simulations based 
on this extended model reproduce the observed negative correlation between the capital growth rate 
and the TFP growth rate. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Technology Upgrading with Learning Cost 
This section formalises the idea of learning costs associated with adopting technology in a very 
simple setting. Predictions of this model will be tested with firm-level data in the next section. 
2.1 Learning Cost 
  New technologies incur both tangible and intangible costs. The tangible costs are those 
associated with purchasing the new technology itself, e.g. capital equipment, computer hardware, 
software. However these specific costs are only one part of the total cost of adopting a new 
technology.   Figure 1 illustrates the idea of learning cost as it relates to adopting a new technology. In 
Figure 1, the horizontal axis shows time and the vertical axis productivity. Suppose that a new 
technology with a potential productivity A0 was adopted at time T0. Case a shows the case where 
there is no learning cost. In this case, the potential productivity of the new technology is fully realised 
at the moment when it is installed. Usually, however, it takes time and resources to assimilate a new 
technology and realise its benefits. Cases b and c illustrate situations that include such learning costs. 
In the figure, case c incurs higher learning costs than case b. 











  Because there are learning costs associated with the adoption of new technology, its 
implementation tends to reduce productivity in the short term, even though the potential productivity 
gain in the long run outweighs this short term loss. Fundamentally, adopting new technology is 
similar to investing in physical capital in the sense that it requires short term expenditures that offer 
long term returns when the technology is appropriate and implemented and utilised successfully. 
  Figure 2 illustrates this idea in a simple context. In the first and the second panels, the effects 
of upgrading technology are separated into two factors: level effect and learning effect. The first 
panel shows two learning curves L1 and L2 with different starting points in time. Both start from 0 and 
converge to 1 over time. The second panel shows potential productivity levels of the old and the new 
technology as A1 and A2. Consider a technology upgrading at time t0. This upgrade increases potential 
productivity from A1 to A2, but it also requires a shift to the new learning curve, L2. The combined 
effect of the technology upgrade is depicted in the third panel. At the moment of the upgrade at time 
t0, the productivity of the new technology A2 L2 is lower than that of the old one A1 L1.
 8  But, even 
with this dramatic initial fall in productivity, it is not necessarily cost effective to continue utilising 
the old technology. The productivity of the new technology A2 L2 increases faster and catches up with 
that of the old technology A1 L1 over time. 
 
                                                      
8   This idea of initial inferiority of a new technology with potential superiority was succinctly summarised in Young 
[1993] as follows.  
  
[Existing] models of invention make the surprising assumption that new technologies attain their full productive 
potential at the moment of their invention and are, at that point in time, superior (or at least equal) to the older 
technologies for which they substitute. The history of technical change suggests, however, that most new technologies 
are, in fact, initially broadly inferior to the older technologies they seek to replace and are actually competitive in only a 
narrow range of specialised functions.  Incremental improvements over time, however, allow new technologies to 
ultimately dominate older systems of production across a wide variety of activities. 
 
  5Figure 2. Effects of adopting new technology at time T0 
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  The idea of learning cost in technology upgrading can also be extended and applied to issues 
affecting industries or economies in aggregate. Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon [1993], for example, 
tried to explain technological leapfrogging in international trade based on this idea: 
[...] at times of a new invention or a major technological breakthrough, economic leadership, since it also 
implies high wages, can deter the adoption of new ideas in the most advanced countries. A new technology 
may well seem initially inferior to older methods to those who have extensive experience with those older 
methods; yet that initially inferior technology may well have more potential for improvements and 
adaptation. When technological progress takes this form, economic leadership will tend to be the source of 
its own downfall. 
 
As the authors admitted, however, their paper was based on a restrictive assumption that individuals 
are too myopic to consider the long run benefits of adopting a new technology when they choose 
between the new technology and the existing one. In this section, we will explicitly consider 
optimisation behaviour that weighs short run costs of technology upgrading against its long run 
benefits. 
  62.2   Setup of the Model 
  This is a minimalist model which focuses on the issue of productivity change caused by 
upgrading technology. The only choice variable in this simplistic model is the timing of technology 
upgrading. The producer is chooses the optimal timing for upgrading technology so as to maximise 
the net present value of the output flow. 
Assumptions 2.1 (Production) (1) Labour is the only input for production and it is fixed. 
Specifically, labour input is normalised  as 1. By construction, output is equal to productivity.
9 (2) 
The producer cannot employ more than one type of technology at the same time.
10 The producer can 
upgrade technology by discarding the current one and adopting a new technology with higher 
potential productivity, as better and better technology becomes available. 
  Expanding available technology set allows the producer to adopt newer technologies with 
higher potential productivity. These upgrades, however, incur both tangible and intangible costs. 
Tangible costs are the costs associated with obtaining the new technology. Intangible costs arise from 
the fact that it takes time and resources to implement the new technology and to see its utilisation 
reach its full potential. I will label these “upgrade cost” and “learning cost”, respectively. Following 
two assumptions with specific functional forms makes the model very simple and tractable without 
sacrificing the spirit of the model.  
Assumptions 2.2 (Upgrading technology and upgrade cost) (1) Upgrading technology allows the 
producer to adopt the most up-to-date technology that has the highest available productivity 
potential.  When technology is upgraded, potential productivity jumps to the frontier level which 
increases at a constant growth rate, α . (2) Each upgrade incurs cost associated with the upgrade 
that is proportional to the potential productivity of the new technology with a ratio of β  
11. To avoid 
the corner solution case where the upgrade cost is prohibitively high, it is also assumed that 
. 
1 1 ) (
− − + − < γ ρ ρ β
Assumptions 2.3 (Learning a new technology and learning cost) (1) When a technology is 
upgraded, experience with the existing technology is not transferred to the new technology.
12 (2) 
                                                      
9   In this case, one can assume that technology-specific experience is embodied in labour as in Zeckhauser [1968] and 
Helpman and Rangel [1998].
  
10   This is a usual assumption in the exiting models. For example, Cooley, Greenwood, and Yorukoglu [1997] or 
Klenow [1997] assumes that a plant can use only one technology at a time, which raises the question of when to 
replace the old technology with the new one. 
 
11    This proportional upgrading cost assumption allows us to have evenly spaced optimal timing and makes the 
calculation much simpler. (See Proposition 2.1) In case we have fixed upgrading cost, the optimal time interval of 
upgrading gets shorter and shorter as potential productivity increases. 
12    In other words, experience is technology-specific. An empirical justification of this assumption is found in Irwin and 
Klenow [1994]. Using firm-level data on seven generations of DRAM semiconductor chips over 1974-92, they 
showed that intergenerational learning spillovers are weak. One can also consider partial transfer of experience, but 
this strong assumption of zero-transferability makes the calculation much simpler without sacrificing the spirit of the 
  7Within each generation of technology, productivity increases over time starting from zero and 
converging to its potential level with a decelerating growth rate. Specifically, the convergence of 




















                                                                                                                                                                                   
model. One can easily consider partial transfer of experience, under a more general assumption that experience is 
transferred to the next generation technology with the ratio of ( 1 − δ ) and that 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. By defining β’ as (β  + cδ ) 
and substituting it for β, all the following equations can easily include a more general case allowing for partial 
transferability. In this case, a change in δ  has the qualitatively same effect as a change in β. 
13    This is a typical functional form of deterministic learning process. See Parente [1994] and Jovanovic and Nyarko 
[1995] for the differential equation version of this representation. Its discreet time version is found in Hornstein and 
Krusell [1996] and in Yorukoglu [1998]. A major limitation of this type of learning process is that it is given as an 
exogenous process. Learning process can be made endogenous by introducing investment in learning (as in 
Greenwood and Yorukoglu [1996]) or by making it dependent upon cumulative output (as in Klenow [1998]).  
14   Notice that large γ  represents low learning cost while large β  means high upgrading cost.
 
  8From Assumption 2.1-2.3, output at time t under the n-th generation of technology is the following:  






() t nttt nn ∈ − [, 1 )
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 (2.1) 
Without loss of generality, we can change the unit so that A0  equals 1. 
    where   ye e t
tt n =−
−− −− αγ 11 1 ()
() ttt nn ∈ − [, 1 )  (2.1’) 
Now the producer has to choose the sequence of optimal upgrade timings { which 
maximises the net present value. (See Figure 3) 
, , , ,...}
** * * tttt 12 3 4
  In calculating the net present value, we assume that the discount rate is given and constant 
for simplicity. 
Assumptions 2.4 (Discount rate) (1) The discount rate is given as ρ. (2) The discounted present 
value of output is well defined with this discount rate. To be specific, the growth rate of potential 
productivity from the evolution of frontier technology is lower than the discount rate: ρ α > . 
  The net present value can be calculated in the following two steps. First, we calculate the 
discounted net present value of output flow under the n-th generation of technology evaluated at the 
beginning of that technology. Second, we calculate the discounted infinite sum of discounted present 
value of output flow in each generation (V1, V2, V3, V4,...) evaluated at time 0.   
  The following proposition makes the calculation of net present value even simpler.   
Proposition 2.1  The optimal upgrade timing is evenly spaced. In other words, it is optimal to 
upgrade technology at a constant time interval. 
Intuitively, a constant time interval seems consistent with the exponential and multiplicative 
functional form of the optimisation problem which makes the choice of the (n + 1)-th upgrading 
timing at the moment of n-th upgrading look alike for any n. For more formal proof, 
Proof: See appendix. ♦ 
  Proposition 2.1 allows us to solve the maximisation problem with respect to just one choice 
variable, the upgrading interval. We define this upgrading interval as follows. λ ≡− − tt nn 1 for any n 
= 1, 2, 3, .... 
  Now, output at time ( ) ) 1 ( λ τ − + n  under the n-th generation of technology is: 
   where  ) 1 (
) 1 (
) 1 (
τ γ λ α
λ τ
− −
− + − = e e y
n
n ) , 0 [ λ τ ∈ . (2.1’’) 
  9  First, the discounted net present value of output flow under the n-th generation of technology 
evaluated at the moment when the technology is introduced is: 
     (2.2)  ) (
0
) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 ( β β τ
λ λ α λ α τ ρ
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  Second, discounted infinite sum of net present value of output in each generation can be 
expressed as follows. 




























2.3 Optimal Upgrading Interval and Its Implications 
  Now, the optimal timing for upgrading technology can be found by choosing λ  so as to  








= V  (2.5) 



















λ γ ρ λ ρ = + + −
+
− + −
+ − − ] } ) ( 1 { 1 [
) (
1
] ) 1 ( 1 [
1 ) ( e e  (2.7) 
  From equation (2.7), we can study how the optimal upgrading interval and the maximised 
net present value of the output are affected by upgrading cost, learning cost, or exogenous 
technological progress. Proposition 2.2 and 2.3 answer this question.  
                                                      
15   The approximation for the last term in equation (2.4) comes from the first order Taylor approximation,  e x
x − ≅ − 1  
when x is close enough to 0. So, my approximation is justifiable as long as α  is close enough to ρ . I will use this 
approximation because it makes the following analyses much simpler without distorting the main results.  
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Proof: See appendix. ♦ 
Proposition 2.3  The maximised net present value, V , has the following 
properties: 

















,, => =< => 0 0 0.  (2.9) 
Proof: Envelope theorem. See appendix. ♦ 
  According to Proposition 2.2 and 2.3, a reduction in the cost of an upgrade ( ) or faster 
learning ( ) results in faster technology upgrades and higher net present value. These results are in 
line with intuition. The reduction in the cost of an upgrade or an improvement in the learning process 
makes it less expensive to adopt a new technology by reducing its tangible or intangible costs, and 
hence, makes upgrading more frequent and increases the net present value. For example, consider a 
case involving a software upgrade. If the price of the new software drops, or if it becomes easier to 
learn the new software, customers will be more willing to purchase it.  
β ↓
γ ↑
  Proposition 2.2 and 2.3 also state that faster exogenous technological progress ( ) does 
not affect the upgrading interval even though it increases net present value. This prediction is less 
immediately intuitive. If exogenous technological progress occurs more rapidly, the benefit of 
upgrading also increases. If this is the case, then how could the optimal upgrade interval be 
unaffected? The answer comes from the second part of Assumption 2.2, which states that the upgrade 
cost is proportional to potential productivity. Under this assumption, faster technological progress 
increases both potential productivity and upgrade cost at the same time. For this reason the 
assumption of a proportional upgrade cost is not totally benign. However, this assumption is very 
useful in this model and allows us to stipulate Proposition 2.1. Moreover, the strict assumption of 
proportional upgrade cost may provide a bench mark for other situations. 
α ↑
  Using this bench mark case of proportional upgrade cost, for example, consider the case 
where the upgrade cost is fixed and independent of the potential productivity of the adopted 
technology. In this scenario, the upgrade interval will become shorter and shorter over time, because 
the ratio of upgrade cost to potential productivity will get smaller and smaller as the potential 
productivity of the frontier technology increases. In this case, faster technological progress will make 
technology upgrades more frequent, because it increases the benefit of new technology adoption 
  11without increasing the cost. For example, consider the case of personal computers. The computing 
power of personal computers has been increasing exponentially,
16 but the price of personal computers 
has remained almost constant regardless of the increase in computing power. My model predicts that, 
in this case, people will tend to upgrade their personal computers over decreasing intervals of time. 
Moreover, if the increase in computing power becomes more rapid, people will also respond by 
upgrading more quickly.  
  According to Proposition 2.2 and 2.3, all things being equal, a firm with lower upgrade cost 
or faster learning ability will have a shorter upgrade interval and higher net present value of their 
output. As long as the stock market reflects the fundamental value of the firm, the market value of a 
firm with lower upgrade cost or faster learning ability will tend to be higher. Then, will a firm with a 
shorter upgrade interval necessarily have a higher current profit rate as well? The answer from our 
model is: “No, not necessarily.” In our simple model, the initial effect of technology upgrading on 
current net output is negative. So, higher net present value of future output does not necessarily mean 
higher current profit.  
3. IT Capital, Market Value, and Profitability 
The model in Section 2 predicts that a firm having lower upgrade costs, tangible or intangible, will 
tend to upgrade technology more frequently and have a higher market value. But, it is uncertain 
whether a firm with more frequent technology upgrading will necessarily have a higher current profit 
rate. This section tests those predictions using a firm-level accounting data set and offers an 
explanation to the aforementioned seemingly contradictory phenomenon reported in the literature on 
Information Technology (IT).  
3.1 Predictions to Be Tested 
  One of the biggest challenges in testing the model is the fact that variables such as upgrade 
or learning cost coefficients and technology upgrade intervals are not directly observable from 
ordinary firm-level accounting data. To overcome this problem, this section takes an indirect 
approach of using an observable proxy which seems to be highly correlated with the unobservable 
variable in the model.  
  Even though a company’s learning ability in technology upgrading is not directly 
observable, IT capital intensity seems to be correlated with such learning speed in technology 
upgrading. It is not only because IT investment itself is a particular form of technology upgrading but 
also because IT capital is expected to improve learning ability for other forms of technology 
upgrading. In other words, a company with faster learning ability will be more active in accumulating 
                                                      
16  For example, Moore’s law says computer processing speed has been doubled every 18 months.  
  12IT capital, while installed IT capital will again help a company to reduce its intangible upgrade costs 
in subsequent technology adoptions. One can also consider the skilled-worker share instead of the IT-
capital share as a proxy variable for a company’s learning ability. For example, the learning equation 
in the model by Greenwood and Yorukoglu [1997] is based on the idea that the amount of skilled 
labour hired by the plant would facilitate the adoption of a new technology. In this paper, IT capital 
rather than skilled labour was used as a proxy for the learning ability in the following regressions, 
simply because this information was available from the obtained data set. Empirical evidence of skill-
technology complementarity is found in Bartel and Lichtenberg [1987] and Autor, Katz, and Krueger 
[1997], among others. 
  Similarly, the average frequency of technology upgrading is not directly observable from 
firm-level accounting data. But, more frequent technology upgrading will be accompanied by higher 
capital turnover rate, because technology upgrading usually requires the replacement of old capital by 
new one. According to the notion of investment-specific technological progress, technological 
progress is embodied in the form of new capital goods and investment is a central measure of 
technology upgrading. Of course, some investment is obviously unrelated with technological 
progress. Investment for simply expanding the existing capacity will be a good example. However, 
observations that technology use is virtually uncorrelated with the plant age and that investment has a 
distinct spiked pattern suggest that incumbent plants also update their technologies by installing new 
capital goods.
17  
  With IT capital intensity and capital turnover rate as proxies for learning ability and upgrading 
frequency, respectively, the following three testable predictions are derived from the model, especially 
from Proposition 2.2 and 2.3.  
Prediction 3.1 The partial correlation between IT capital intensity and capital turnover rate will be 
positive. 
Prediction 3.2 The partial correlation between IT capital intensity and market value of the company 
will be positive. 
Prediction 3.3 The partial correlation between IT capital intensity and return on asset (ROA) can 
have any sign.  
In the following subsections, I will describe the data set and report the results of my panel regressions 
which test these predictions.  
3.2 Data  
  The data is an unbalanced panel data from 1,031 US firms for a 10-year period (1986-1995) 
constructed by combining two major sources, Computer Intelligence and Compustat.  
                                                      
17   See Cooley, Greenwood, and Yorukoglu [1997] and Klenow [1998]. 
  13•  The Computer Intelligence panel has the total value of computer stock (including central 
processors, personal computers, peripherals, etc.) for Fortune 1000 firms. Because the list of 
Fortune 1000 firms has names that drop on or off the list from year to year, the number of firms 
covered in Computer Intelligence data set exceeds 1,000.  
•  The Compustat data set was consulted to gather other information such as market value, physical 
capital, return on assets, debt-to-equity ratio, etc. Those two data sets were linked together by 
using the ticker symbol of each company.  
Variables in the regressions are constructed in the following way. 
•  Market Value (of a Company): A company’s market value is calculated by adding up each item 
of its liabilities evaluated in the market price. I added up common stock, preferred stock, and debt 
reported in the Compustat data base. In this data base, only common stock is evaluated in the 
market price. As preferred stock and debt are not evaluated in the market value, but in book value, 
the market value in my regressions is a very rough measure of a company’s real market value. A 
much more detailed data set and additional assumptions (for pricing each type of debt) would be 
required to calculate the market value more precisely. But, what is more important in my 
regressions is not the exact level of market value but the trend of market value depending on other 
explanatory variables. The market value series in my regressions capture the response of each 
company’s market value in the equity market.  
•  IT Capital: I used the total value of computer stock (central processors, personal computers, 
peripherals, etc.) reported in the Computer Intelligence data set. 
•  Capital: I used the series of “Property, Plant, & Equipment” reported in the Compustat. When IT 
capital intensity is calculated, I used the net value of “Property, Plant, & Equipment”. When 
calculating the capital turnover rate, I used the gross value of  “Property, Plant, & Equipment”. 
•  IT Capital Intensity: IT-capital divided by capital. That is, the total value of computer stock 
divided by the net value of “Property, Plant, & Equipment” 
•  Capital Turnover Rate: I used the log growth rate of gross capital over the coming three years 
from the current year. By using the gross value of the capital rather than the net value, this capital 
turn over rate captures not only the increase in new capital but also the disposal of old capital. 
•  Return on Asset (ROA): As a measure of profitability, I used the ROA reported in Compustat. 
In calculating this ROA, annual net profit is divided by the average of assets at the beginning of 
the year and at the end of the year. 
  143.3 Regression Results 
To test the three predictions in the previous subsection, I ran regressions for three equations 
explaining capital turnover rate, market value, and return on asset, respectively.  
Capital Turnover Rate and IT Capital Intensity 
  To test Prediction 3.1, I regressed the capital turnover rate on IT capital intensity, ROA, and 
the ratio of the market value to assets. All variables were transformed into natural logs. It is expected 
that a company with higher ROA or with a higher “q-ratio” (market value divided by total assets) will 
tend to invest more, and hence, to have a higher capital turnover rate. These two variables were added 
to see the pure contribution of IT capital intensity to the capital turnover rate, after controlling other 
factors which affect investment. Firm specific effects were also controlled either by fixed effect panel 
regression or by very detailed (SIC 4-digit) sub-industry dummies.  
 Table  1 shows the results of the (fixed effect) panel regression and the pooled regression 
with SIC 4-digit industry dummies. Estimated coefficients for all the right-hand-side variables had 
expected signs and were statistically significant. This was especially true for the coefficient for IT 
capital intensity which was significantly positive. This means the partial correlation between IT 
capital intensity and capital turnover rate is positive. These empirical results are consistent with 
Prediction 3.1. To summarise, a company with higher IT intensity tends to upgrade technology more 
frequently. 
Table 1. Regressions on Capital Turnover Rate 
Dependent Variable: ln (Capital Turnover Rate)  (t-ratio in parenthesis) 
 (1)  (2) 
 
























Regression Method  Panel Regression 
(fixed effect) 
Pooled Regression 
(with sub-industry dummies) 
  15Market Value and IT Capital Level 
  To test Prediction 3.2, I regressed the market value on IT capital, total assets, ROA, R&D 
spending, and advertisement spending. All variables were transformed into natural logs. In this 
regression, I had to use the IT capital level instead of the IT capital intensity because the left-hand-
side variable (market value) is a level not a ratio. I added other controlling variables such as total 
assets, ROA, R&D spending, and advertisement spending, which are expected to affect market value 
positively. It is obvious that the market value of a firm is an increasing function of the company’s 
size and profitability. One could also suspect that high-tech or big-name companies would tend to be 
valued higher in the stock market. The last two variables, R&D spending and advertisement 
spending, were added to control for this. Again, possible firm specific effects were controlled either 
by fixed effect panel regression or by very detailed (SIC 4-digit) sub-industry dummies.  
  Table 2 shows that the estimated coefficients for all the right-hand-side variables had the 
expected signs and were statistically significant. Especially, the coefficient for the IT capital level is 
significantly positive, which means that the partial correlation between IT capital and market value is 
positive even when the total assets have been controlled for. These empirical results are consistent 
with Prediction 3.2. To summarise, a company with higher IT capital but with the same total assets 
tends to have higher market value, if all the other factors are the same. 
Table 2. Regressions on Market Value 
Dependent Variable: ln (Market Value)  (t-ratio in parenthesis) 
 (1)  (2) 































Regression Method  Panel Regression 
(fixed effect) 
Pooled Regression 
(with sub-industry dummies) 
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Return on Asset (ROA) and IT Capital Intensity 
  For Prediction 3.3, I regressed ROA on IT capital intensity and two control variables, the 
sales-to-asset ratio, and the debt-to-equity ratio. All variables were transformed into natural logs. The 
sales-to-asset ratio is expected to affect ROA positively, while the debt-to-equity ratio is expected to 
affect ROA negatively by increasing interest spending. As in previous cases, possible firm specific 
effects were also controlled either by fixed effect panel regression or by very detailed (SIC 4-digit) 
sub-industry dummies.  
  The estimated coefficients for the sales-to-asset ratio and the debt-to-equity ratio had correct 
signs and were statistically significant (Table 3). Interestingly, the coefficient for IT capital intensity 
is significantly negative. That is, the partial correlation between IT capital intensity and ROA is 
negative. These empirical results are consistent with Prediction 2.3. In other words, a company with 
higher IT capital intensity tends to upgrade technology more rapidly and have a higher market value, 
but its profitability is not necessarily higher. 
 
Table 3. Regressions on ROA 
Dependent Variable: ln (ROA)  (t-ratio in parenthesis) 
 (1)  (2) 
 
























Regression Method  Panel Regression 
(fixed effect) 
Pooled Regression 
(with sub-industry dummies) 
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4. Industry-wide Learning and Technological Change 
The notion of learning costs in technology upgrading can also be extended and applied to issues affecting 
industries or economies in aggregate. From this section, I will extend the scope of the study from firm-
level to industry-level and develop my argument further both empirically and theoretically. 
4.1 Learning-by-Doing at the Industry Level 
  An employee’s skill, or the productivity of a production line, increases with experience and 
repetition. This is the basic concept underlying so-called “learning-by-doing.” Learning-by-doing 
effects have been observed both at the personal level and in larger work units such as factories. It 
should be emphasised, however, that productivity growth at the factory level is not the simple sum of 
the learning-by-doing effects of individual workers. This is evident from the fact that the productivity 
growth of a factory is observed even when there is high worker turnover. That is to say, there exists 
“organisational learning” which cannot be reduced to the sum of “individual learning.” For example, 
co-ordination among different divisions in a factory becomes increasingly efficient as the factory 
gains experience through repetition. We can also consider learning-by-doing at the industry level, 
which cannot be reduced to the simple sum of individual firms comprising that industry. This is 
because there are various types of externalities or spillover effects among firms which belong to the 
same industry. A new entrant in the auto industry would accrue benefits from the experience of 
existing firms, for example, in training workers or in constructing a system of auto-part suppliers.  
  Many theoretical models for international trade and economic growth simply assume the 
existence of industry-wide learning-by-doing. Based on this assumption, these models try to explain 
the success of the export-led growth strategy of Japan and the Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) 
in East Asia. In trade models, the concept of industry-wide learning-by-doing is used to show that 
protective trade policies could be effective under certain conditions. For example, Krugman [1984, 
1987] showed that Japanese style protective industrial policies could create a comparative advantage 
if there exists dynamic economies of scale due to industry-wide learning-by-doing. In growth models, 
learning-by-doing effects are a significant component of endogenous productivity growth, especially 
in developing countries where imitation rather than invention is the dominant form of technological 
progress. In this context, Lucas [1993] pointed to learning-by-doing as the source of the rapid growth 
in East Asian NICs. Surprisingly, however, there are very few previous empirical works which tried 
to measure the size of learning-by-doing effects at the industry-level.
 18 
                                                      
18   Sheshinski [1967] and Bahk and Gort [1993] belong to rare exceptions, but their estimations were basically cross-
sectional estimations: Sheshinski did cross-state and cross-country regressions, while Bahk and Gort did cross-firm 
regressions. Using cross-sectional data instead of time-series data is not the best way of measuring the size of 
  18   In this section, I estimate the relative size of industry-wide learning-by-doing effects using 
annual data of Japanese machinery manufacturing from 1955 to 1990. I chose the Japanese machinery 
manufacturing data as a starting point, considering the following facts. First, the aforementioned 
“strategic trade policy” models, which assume industry-wide learning-by-doing, are motivated by the 
model of Japanese industrial policies and export-led growth. Secondly, Japan seems to have the best 
industry-level data among the East Asian countries that pursued the export-led growth strategy based 
primarily on imitation rather than invention. Thirdly, those 15 sub-industries
19, whose primary 
business involved machine manufacturing, make the majority of the products which have been 
associated in the literature with strong factory-level learning-by-doing (for example, shipbuilding, 
aircraft, motor vehicle, electronic parts, etc.).  
4.2 Estimating Industry-wide Learning-by-Doing 
  In the literature which discusses learning-by-doing at the factory or firm level, the most 
typical way of measuring the learning-by-doing effect is to estimate the “learning curve” which 
relates a productivity measure (or, unit cost as the reciprocal of a productivity measure) to an 
experience measure (e.g., cumulative output) in a log-linear form as follows.
 20    
   (4.1)  ln ln UC c c Q t =− 01 t
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 where    UCt : unit cost,  : cumulative output, c : learning coefficient.  Qt 1
This conventional formulation of learning-by-doing, which means that the unit cost decreases by c1 % 
as the cumulative output increases by 1 %, is valid only in ceteris paribus cases. In other words, this 
formulation assumes that there have been no changes either in capital stock or in technology. Under 
such assumptions, all the productivity gains are attributed to the learning-by-doing effects. These 
assumptions are reasonable for the estimation of the learning coefficient of a production line over a 
relatively short period.  
  In measuring industry-wide learning-by-doing with data spanning over several decades, 
however, it is unrealistic to assume that the capital stock and the technology level remain unchanged. 
Therefore, changes in the capital stock and in the technology level should be explicitly taken into 
account when attempting to identify industry-wide learning-by-doing. For this purpose, consider an 
aggregate production function having the productivity factor,  , as a function of both cumulative 
output and time trend. 
At
 
learning-by-doing which occurs over time. Naturally, conventional learning curve estimations at individual or factory 
level usually use time series data.  Argote and Epple [1990] provides a succinct survey on learning curve estimations.  
 
19   The categories of these sub-industries are comparable to three digit SIC codes. 
 
20  For example, see Argote and Epple [1990] and references there. 
 
  19    where YA f K L ttt t = (,) ( ) AA Q E x pt tt =⋅⋅ ⋅ 0










     (Y: output, K: capital input, L: labour input, Q: cumulative output) 
Here, γ is the learning coefficient, and δ represents the speed of exogenous technological progress. 
From equation (4.2), we can estimate the learning coefficient after the changes in inputs and in the 
technology level are controlled for.  
  For estimation, I specified production functions for 15 sub-industries in a log-linear form as 
follows:  
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 where  E  , but  ,  [] it ε = 0 [] E it jt εε ⋅≠ 0 [ ] E it is εε ⋅≠ 0.  
I did not impose the constant-returns-to-scale assumption (i.e., α + β = 1) in order to prevent the 
possibility of wrongly attributing static scale effects to learning-by-doing. 
  In (4.3), I assumed that all the equations in this system are connected with one another 
through the correlation of the error terms. It is reasonable to assume that a shock to a certain sub-
industry propagates to related ones. For example, communication equipment industry or computer 
industry is very likely to be affected by a major upheaval in the electronic parts industry. Also, a 
common shock can affect related sub-industries at the same time. In such cases, where error terms are 
correlated with one another, we can get a more efficient estimate by using so-called “Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR).” Before running regressions on the system equation (4.3), endogeneity 
problem in some of the right-hand-side variables should be considered. For instance, if there is a 
positive shock to a sub-industry, whereby it increases not only its output but also the demand for and 
utilisation of its inputs. This means that capital and labour in our model are endogenous and therefore 
correlated with the error terms. In this case, “Ordinary Least Square (OLS)” estimation or its system 
estimation equivalent, “Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR)”, will yield inconsistent estimates. 
To solve this problem, we need to use instrumental variables. In the context of “full information 
system estimation,” it is just “Three Stage Least Square Estimation (3SLS).” Real wages, the real 
interest rate, the relative price of capital goods, and their lagged variables are used as instruments. 
  I used data from 15 sub-industries of the Japanese machinery industry from 1955 to 1990. 
The data for net output, capital, and labour in each sub-industry were obtained from  Census of 
Manufactures, Vol. 2.,  Report by industries (each year). This annual report is published by the 
Research and Statistics Department in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). The 
  20current format based on the Japanese Standard Industrial Classification (JSIC) was established in 
1955. The data on price, wage, and interest rate were obtained from the Japan Statistical Yearbook 
published by the Statistics Bureau in Management and Coordination Agency.
21  
Each variable in the regression was constructed in the following way. 
•  Net output: I deflated the value-added numbers from the  Census of Manufactures using the 
wholesale price indexes from the Japan Statistical Yearbook. The definition of "value-added" in 
the Census of Manufactures is: (Value-added) = (Value of gross output) - (Domestic consumption 
tax) - (Value of intermediate input) - (Depreciation). Industry-specific wholesale price indexes 
(i.e., wholesale price index for general machinery, that for electrical machinery, and that for 
transport equipment) were used as deflators for each sub-industry depending on the industry to 
which it belongs.  
•  Capital: The current stock of the fixed tangible assets reported in the Census of Manufactures 
was deflated by the wholesale price index of capital goods.  
•  Labour: I used the number of workers reported in the Census of Manufactures. This number 
includes self-employed workers and unpaid family workers as well as employees. 
•  Real wage: The "Average monthly cash earnings per regular worker by industry" as reported in 
the Japan Statistical Yearbook were deflated by the consumer price index. Cash earnings are the 
sum of contracted earnings and extra payments. 
•  Real interest rate: The "Averages of agreed interest rates on loans" of all banks were used after 
being corrected by wholesale price inflation.  
•  Relative Price of Capital Goods: The wholesale price index of capital goods was divided by the 
weighted-average wholesale price index of all commodities.    
4.3 Findings 
  The main result of the estimation is summarised in Figure 4.
22 It shows an interesting 
relation between the learning coefficient and the speed of technological change. Industry-wide 
learning-by-doing effects were most pronounced in low-tech industries where technological change 
                                                      
21   This yearbook refers to following original sources: Research and Statistics Department, The Bank of Japan, Annual 
Report on Price Indexes; Statistics Bureau, Management and Co-ordination Agency, Annual Report on the Consumer 
Price Index; Research and Statistics Department, The Bank of Japan, Annual Report on Economic Statistics; Policy 
Planning and Research Department, Ministry of Labour, Monthly Labour Survey. 
 
22   Due to the lack of space, more detailed tables for regression results are not reported here but available upon request.
 
  21was relatively slow. In contrast, the learning-by-doing effect was insignificant or even negative in 
high-tech industries which were experiencing rapid change in their technology.  
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  These findings, on one hand, seem to confirm the validity of theoretical models which 
assume industry-wide learning-by-doing. But, on the other hand, they reveal the limit of the 
applicability of those models by showing that the industry-wide learning-by-doing effect is strong 
only in low-tech industries. Already questionable effectiveness of protective trade/industry policies, 
  22namely, policies of nurturing an infant industry via learning-by-doing, becomes even weaker in high-
tech industries. 
  This negative correlation between learning-by-doing and exogenous technological progress 
can be explained in both directions of causality: (1) from technology to learning; and (2) from 
learning to technology.  
•  From Technology to Learning:    In low-tech industries, production methods do not 
change frequently and it is relatively easy to improve productivity simply by imitating 
existing technology and best practise in using it. As the production method evolves more 
rapidly, however, the opportunity to improve productivity through imitation decreases. In 
high-tech industries, invention rather than imitation is the dominant form of technological 
change, and hence, R&D rather than learning-by-doing becomes the primary factor that 
determines productivity growth.  
•  From Learning to Technology:   The technology upgrading model in Section 2 delineates 
another aspect of the story explaining the negative correlation between technological change 
and learning-by-doing. According to the model (especially, see Proposition 2.2), the more 
significant learning becomes in upgrading technology (i.e., the smaller γ is), the slower the 
pace for technology upgrades. This prediction of the model can be explained intuitively as 
follows. In an industry where productivity growth from learning-by-doing lasts for a long 
time, the incentive for frequent innovation will be relatively small. On the contrary, in an 
industry where the productivity potential for a specific technology is fully realised within a 
short period of learning, the room for productivity growth through learning-by-doing will 
disappear quickly. In this case, technology upgrading will play a much more significant role 
than learning-by-doing with existing technology.    
5. Investment and Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
  Data suggest that total factor productivity (TFP) growth tends to decrease with faster capital 
accumulation. This negative correlation between the movement of the capital growth rate and that of 
the productivity growth rate is very widely observed across different sectors. Moreover, this basic 
pattern is not affected by various methods for measuring capital stock, or varying levels of 
aggregation. This section argues that this intriguing pattern conforms better with the idea of learning 
cost in installing new capital than with other competing stories. 
5.1 Empirics: Accelerating investment decelerates TFP growth 
  Comparing the TFP growth rate and the capital growth rate reveals a very intriguing pattern: 
the TFP growth rate tends to decrease [increase] when capital accumulation becomes more rapid 
  23[slower]. This pattern is repeatedly observed in various data with various aggregation levels.
23  
 
Figure 5. TFP Growth Rate and Capital Growth Rate  















Figure 6. TFP Growth Rate and Capital Growth Rate  












                                                      
23  See Appendix 2, for methodology and data sources. 
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Figure 7. TFP Growth Rate and Capital Growth Rate  















Figure 8. TFP Growth Rate and Capital Growth Rate  
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Figure 9. TFP Growth Rate and Capital Growth Rate  












Figure 10. TFP Growth Rate and Capital Growth Rate  














  26Table 4. Capital Accumulation and Productivity Growth  
(Major Industries, Japan)  
*: significantly different from 0 at the level of  95% (t-ratio from simple regression in parenthesis)  
  Correlation [∆ , ]  2 ln( ) TFP ∆
2 ln( ) K












































































  27Table 5. Capital Accumulation and Productivity Growth  
(Machinery Industries, Japan) 
 
 (t-ratio from simple regression in parenthesis) 
  Correlation [ ,∆ ]  ∆
2 ln( ) TFP
2 ln( ) K








General industrial machinery and equipment  
-0.376 
(-3.288) 
Electrical generating, transmission, distribution apparatus  
 -0.572 
(-2.327) 













































  28Table 6. Capital Accumulation and Productivity Growth  
(3 sub-industries, US) 
 
 (t-ratio from simple regression in parenthesis) 
  Correlation [ ,∆ ]  ∆
2 ln( ) TFP
2 ln( ) K












 Figure  5 through Figure 10 demonstrate this point graphically. They have different data 
sources, aggregation levels, industries, and different countries, but still they show the same pattern. 
The capital growth rate and the TFP growth rate tend to move in opposite directions under most 
circumstances. In other words, one curve tends to go up when the other one goes down, and vice 
versa.  
  As a quantitative measure for the pattern observed in the figures listed above, consider the 
correlation between the change in TFP growth rate (i.e.  ) and the change in the capital 
growth rate (i.e.  ). If the TFP growth rate decreases [increases] when the capital growth rate 
increases [decreases], this correlation will be negative. Table 4 through Table 6 report the values of 
Correlation[ , ]. To check the statistical significance of the sign of the 
correlation, I added the t-ratio from the simple regression of   on   in the 
parenthesis below the correlation.  
∆
2 ln( ) TFP
2 ∆
∆
2 ln( ) K
ln( ) TFP ∆
2 ∆
2 ln( ) K
) ln(TFP ) ln(
2 K ∆
  As shown in Table 4, the correlation is -0.357 for total industry aggregates, and -0.478 for 
manufacturing aggregates. The negative sign of either number is statistically significant. Among the 
17 industries in manufacturing, 9 industries showed a significant, negative correlation. 6 showed 
positive correlation, but none of them were statistically significant. Table 5 and Table 6 show the 
correlation values at the level of three or four digit SIC sub-industries in the machinery industry. For 
all of the 18 sub-industries in Japan and the US, the correlation was negative. All in all, the 
correlation values confirm the observed pattern of the capital growth rate and the TFP growth rate’s 
tendency to move to opposite directions. In other words, there is a tendency for productivity growth 
to slow down when investment is accelerated. 
  295.2 Possible Explanations  
  The immediate impact of increasing investment growth on productivity growth appears to be 
negative. Similarly, Power (1998) also found that there was little evidence of a robust positive 
correlation between recent investment spike and productivity level, from examining the relationship 
between investment age, plant age, and productivity using the Longitudinal Research Database 
(LRD) in the US covering 14,000 plants over 18-year period. Then, how to explain this finding that 
investment drive could decelerate productivity growth? If the TFP growth rate decreases when the 
observed capital growth rate increases, there are two possibilities: (1) it is an accounting phenomenon 
(discrepancy between reported capital stock and real capital stock); or, (2) it is a real phenomenon 
(some lag effect between increasing investment and output increase).  
  The “time-to-build” argument can be a good explanation for the former case. Usually, there 
is a lag between the time when the investment is first received and the time when the capital 
equipment is finally built and utilised in production. When we have a discrepancy between the time 
when the investment expenditure is made and the time when new equipment started operating on the 
production floor, increased capital stock as it shows on the ledger will not increase real output 
immediately. In this sense, “time-to-build” can be regarded as an accounting problem. Or, one might 
suspect that it is problematic to regard the book value of fixed assets as capital stock.  
  But, this negative correlation between investment and productivity is observed even after 
controlling this time-to-build factor. In Figure 5 and Figure 6, for example, the capital series was 
calculated based on fixed tangible assets excluding construction in process. In other words, the “time-
to-build” factor cannot affect capital stock in this case, because capital expenditures on unfinished 
projects were not included in the value of capital stock. If one points to the problem of using the book 
value in determining capital stock series, Figure 9 and Figure 10 are good counter examples because 
the capital series was constructed instead of using the book value of fixed assets. Therefore, we need 
to explain this negative relation between investment growth and productivity growth as a real 
phenomenon. 
  One can think of several real factors that could produce a delay in the full realisation of 
increased productivity from newly acquired capital equipment. For a good example of what causes 
this kind of “gestation lag” when a company is procuring new capital equipment, one can think about 
“(intangible) adjustment cost” in investment. This cost is intangible in the sense that it is not captured 
as an explicit cost in accounting. Once a new investment project is initiated, human resources as well 
as physical resources are diverted to this investment project. As those diverted resources are 
employed for this new priority, their contribution to output is diminished or may be negligible during 
the transition period. If such adjustment costs are high, productivity will temporarily decrease when 
new investment increases. Following Section 2, I will call such intangible cost in starting a new 
investment project the “learning cost”. In this terminology, I understand adjustment of an 
organisation to a new circumstance as “organisational learning”. 
  306. Simulations: Learning Cost and Productivity 
  In this section, I try to show that the observed pattern between investment and productivity is 
explained quite well by the idea of learning cost associated with acquiring new capital equipment. 
This is an extension of the technology upgrading model discussed in Section 2. As it takes time and 
resources to realise the maximum benefit from new technology, so it will take time and effort for any 
company to realise the potential productivity gain from newly acquired capital equipment. When the 
number of producers installing new capital equipment increases, the capital growth rate will increase 
but the TFP growth rate will initially decrease due to the increased intangible cost (i.e., learning cost).  
  At first, I will extend the technology upgrading model presented in Section 2, from the 
individual producer’s level to the aggregated industry level. Using this extended model, I will do 
some simulations and show that the learning cost model successfully reproduces the observed 
negative correlation between the investment trend and the productivity growth trend.  
  I am going to build a simple model for investment and productivity in which there is 
learning cost associated with acquiring new capital equipment. In this model, productivity growth is 
the result of either learning-by-doing effect from utilising the existing technology or technology 
upgrading effect from adopting a new technology with higher productivity potential. To adopt a new 
technology, however, one must buy new capital goods which embody the new technology.
24 
Acquiring new capital equipment requires not only capital expenditures but also incurs learning cost, 
because it takes time and effort for the potential productivity of the newly installed equipment to be 
fully realised. This model has the same basic structure as the technology upgrading model in Section 
2. 
  For simplicity, I will specify the production function as follows. The output of an individual 
producer at time t under the current technology employed at time t  is:   n
     where  tt ) t nn 1 (
) (
0
n n t t t
t e e A Y
− − − ⋅ =
γ α ∈ + [, ) 1    (6.1) 
This specification is based on the following assumptions. 
Assumptions 6.1 (Production) Capital functions as the container of technology. Labour is fixed for 
each producer. By construction, the output level is determined by productivity, and the productivity 
growth rate is equal to the output growth rate.  
                                                      
24   In this respect, this simple model shares some main features of a vintage capital model in Colley, Greenwood, and 
Yorukoglu [1997]: i) Technological progress is embodied in the form of new capital goods; ii) The firm should 
decide when to replace its existing capital with a new vintage; and therefore iii) Investment is a lumpy decision and 
capital only disappears because of replacement. 
  31Assumptions 6.2 (Productivity) (1) Productivity is determined by two factors: the potential 
productivity of the current technology and the learning effect through accumulated experience with 
the currently employed technology. (2) The potential productivity level depends on the time when the 
current technology is employed, and the more recently employed technology has higher potential 
productivity with the growth rate of α , reflecting exogenous technological progress. [ ] (3) 
The potential productivity is gradually realised as experience with the current technology increases 










  With another simplifying assumption as follows, the model has exactly the same basic 
structure as the technology upgrading model in Section 2.  
Assumptions 6.3 (Capital) The adoption of new technology requires the acquisition of new capital 
equipment as the container of the technology. The amount of the required capital is proportional to 
the potential productivity of the contained technology.
25  This technology-container capital exists 
without depreciation as long as the contained technology is employed. In other words, the capital 
stock at time t is equal to the amount of capital expenditure at the time of the most recent investment:  
   where     (6.2)  KA e t
tn = β
α
0 tt t nn ∈ + [, ) 1
Given the assumptions listed above, an individual producer who tries to maximise the net present 
value of output flow will acquire new capital at the optimal interval.
26  
  Now, we are ready to extend the model from the level of individual producers to the industry 
level. The following assumption simplifies this extension.  
Assumptions 6.4 (Industry) (1)  The industry consists of a continuum of identical producers. 
Individual producers have the same production function and the same time interval for upgrading, 
λ . They are different from one another only in the time frame in which they choose to upgrade. (2) 
Index x, x∈[, ] 0 λ , represents a producer who made the most recent upgrade at x-units of time ago. 
The distribution of individual producers with index x at time t follows a probability density function, 
f(x,t). 
  Once the probability density function, f(x,t), is known, one can determine the industry 
aggregates for output and for capital stock from equation (6.3) and equation (6.4), respectively. 
 Aggregate  output:Y   (6.3)  dx t x f e e A
x x t I




γ λ α − − ∫ − =
                                                      
25.  A machine replacement model by Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power [1999], for example, makes very similar 
assumptions. In our case, capital expenditure for new technology adoption is just like the upgrading cost in the 
technology upgrading model in Section 2. 
26   For the properties of this optimal interval, see Section 2. 
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From equation (6.3) and equation (6.4), the industry-level productivity growth rate (which is the same 
as the output growth rate)
27 and the industry-level capital growth rate can be calculated. Now, once 
parameters [ γ α λ , , ] and the functional form of the probability density function [f(x,t)] are given, the 
correlation between the investment trend and productivity growth trend can be calculated 
immediately.  
  Now, we need to specify the probability density function for the distribution of individual 
producers in the industry. As a simple way of mimicking cyclical fluctuations in the aggregate output 
and in the aggregate capital stock observed in actual data, I will specify the probability density 
function using a sine (or cosine) function.
28 Consider the following specification. 
















 where x∈[, ] 0 λ  (6.5) 
This   in equation (5.5) fluctuates around fx t ( , ) 1/ λ  with the wave length λ  and the wave height 
1/λ . (Remember that  λ  is the interval at which a producer chooses to upgrade.)
29 This 
specification simply captures a situation where aggregate investment moves up and down along the 
cycle. In this case, the cyclical movement is created by the fact that there is a fluctuation in the 
number of producers who start a new investment project.  
  Suppose that each producer initiates a new investment project every five years ( λ  = 5 ) and 
that the exogenous technological progress enables frontier technologies to increase potential 
productivity by a 10% growth rate ( α  = 0.1 ). The third parameter γ  is supposed to be 1.
30 From 
equation (6.3) and equation (6.4), with equation (6.5), the productivity growth rate (which is equal to 
the output growth rate) and the capital growth rate can be calculated. Then, by repeating random 
drawing of time t, one can get Correlation [ , ]. With given parameter values, such  ∆
2 ln( ) Y ∆
2 ln( ) K
                                                      
27   See Assumption 6.1.  
28   The links between investment-specific technological changes and the business cycle have been analysed in many 
studies. Recent studies include: Andolfatto and MacDonald [1998]; Campbell [1998]; Cooper and Haltiwanger 
[1993]; Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power [1999]; Jovanovic and Lach [1997]; and Klenow [1998]. 
 
29   Of course,   in equation (5.5) satisfies the following necessary condition to be a probability density function.   fx t (,)
   for any  t. 
0 1
λ
∫ = fx td x (,)
 
30   In this case, it takes 1.6 years until newly installed capital equipment [technology] realizes 80% of its potential 
productivity through the learning process. 99.3% of the potential productivity is realized in 5 years. 
 
  33stochastic simulation has obtained Correlation [ , ] = -0.791. Table 7 shows that this 
correlation is negative most of the cases. 
∆
2 ln( ) Y
2 ln( ) TFP
∆
2 ln( ) K
∆
2 ln( ) K
α
2 ln( ) TFP ∆
2 ln( ) K
Table 7. Simulation Results 
Correlation [ , ]  ∆
 
  α =0.1  α =0.2 
γ =0.5  -0979 -0.719 
γ =1  -0.791 -0.200 
γ =2  -0.257 0.392 
 
  I repeated this simulation changing the parameter values for α  and γ , and plotted the 
correlation as a function of  α  and γ  in Figure 11. Unless the learning cost is very small (i.e.γ  is 
very big) or the exogenous productivity growth rate   is so large as to dominate the learning cost 
effects, Correlation [ , ] is negative.   ∆
2 ln(Y) ∆
2 ln( ) K
Figure 11. Simulation Results 
Correlation [ , ]  ∆
  347. Conclusion 
 
  As it takes time and effort to learn how to fully utilise new technology and realise its 
maximum potential productivity gain, adoption of new technology tends to reduce productivity 
temporarily, even though the potential productivity gain in the long run outweighs this short run loss. 
This paper points to such “learning cost” in technology upgrading as a potential explanation of the 
following two “productivity puzzles” reported in the IT literature and in the studies of East Asian 
economic growth. First, in the 1980s, US companies made enormous IT investments, but little 
productivity gain was observed. Second, TFP growth of East Asian NICs was mediocre in spite of the 
impressive investment drive in those countries. 
  A simple model of optimal intervals for technology upgrading with learning cost is 
developed. This model predicts that a company with higher frequency in technology upgrading will 
tend to have higher market value even with lower current profitability. An empirical study using 
unbalanced panel data of 1,031 US companies from 1986 to 1995 supports this prediction. Extending 
the scope from firm-level to industry-level, the paper estimates the magnitude of industry-wide 
learning-by-doing effects using annual data on 15 sub-industries in the Japanese machinery 
manufacturing sector from 1955 to 1990. The results show that industry-wide learning-by-doing was 
strong in low-tech industries where technological change was relatively slow, while it was 
insignificant in high-tech industries which experienced rapid technological evolution. It is also 
observed in the US and Japanese manufacturing industries that TFP growth tends to decrease with 
faster capital accumulation. Simulations based on an extended model of learning cost reproduce the 
observed negative correlation between the capital growth rate and the TFP growth rate. This negative 
correlation, which is widely observed in industry-level data and reproduced in simulations based on 
the learning cost model, makes mediocre TFP growth in East Asian NICs look much less puzzling. 
  Whether it is adopting new information technology or industrialising a pre-modern 
economy, the initial learning cost related to how to manage these new modes of production will be 
immense. Therefore, it is not surprising at all that the immediate productivity gain in such massive-
scale “technology upgrades” was small. However, it should be emphasised that such seemingly 
optimistic conclusion from a deterministic learning model masks the existence of huge uncertainty 
and underlying heterogeneity accompanying technology upgrading. Adopting a new technology is a 
kind of investment activity in the sense that it pays short term costs expecting long term returns. Like 
any other investment activities, adopting a new technology involves risks and is sensitive to 
investors’ perceptions regarding such risks. One important direction for further studies would be 
incorporating uncertainty into the model. Our model provides an interesting perspective on the large 
swing in the stock market observed in the late 1990s, in comparison with recent studies: (1) The IT 
revolution and the stock market (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1999; Hobjin and Jovanovic, 2001); and 
(2) IT investment and intangible assets, namely, organizational capital (Brynjolfsson et al., 2002; 
Atkeson and Kehoe, 2002) or “e-capital” (Hall 2000, 2001b). Following the spirit of Hall [2001a], a 
follow-up study will offer an explanation for the recent boom and bust in the stock market as a 
rational response to new information affecting perceived learning cost for technology upgrading.  
  35Appendix 1. Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 2.1 
Consider a sequence of upgrading timing, {t0(=0), t1 , t2 , t3 , ...}. The n-th upgrading interval is 
defined as λnn n tt ≡− −1.  
Output at time t under the n-th generation of technology is: 
    where   ye e t
tt n =−
−− −− αγ 11 1 ()
() t nttt nn ∈ − [, 1 )
− )
. (A1.1) 
From equation (A1.1), discounted net present value of output flow under the n-th generation of 
technology evaluated at the moment when the technology is introduced is: 
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Total net present value of output is the discounted infinite sum of net present value of output in each 
generation. It can be expressed as follows. 
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Consider the sequence of optimal upgrading intervals, { . This sequence is the solution to 
the following maximisation problem. 
, , ,...}
*** λλλ 123
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       (A1.5) 
Now suppose that you choose the optimal intervals once again at time t , and call the solution 
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  36Compare equation (A1.5) and equation (A1.6). They are basically the same problem. Therefore, the 
first element of the optimal sequence should be the same in those two problems. That is,  





But, the first problem in equation (A1.5) can be rewritten as follows.  
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Equation (A1.8) shows that the optimal choice of  { does not depend on the choice of  , ,...}
** λλ 23 λ1. 
Compare equation (A1.8) and equation (A1.6). The optimal choice of  {  in equation (A1.8) 
is the exactly same problem as the choice of  {  in equation (A1.6). So, the first element 
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From equation (A1.7) and equation (A1.9),  
  . (A1.10)  λλ 1
* =
By repeating the reasoning, we get .  ♦  λλλλ 1234
*** * ... ====
Proof of Proposition 2.2 
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  37Notice that this is a hump shape function with  ff () , ( ) 00 0 = ∞ = . Using this function, the first order 
condition can be rewritten as follows. 
  ff () ( ( ) ) ρλ ρ γ λ
β
λ
−+= . (A1.12) 
In Figure A1.1, left hand side (LHS) and right hand side (RHS) of equation (A1.12) are drawn as a 
function of λ . It is trivial that  LHS LHS () , ( ) 00 0 = ∞ = . LHS in Figure A1.1 is derived from Figure 
A1.2 and shows that LHS intersects the horizontal axis (i.e., RHS whenβ  is 0) from the below just 
once. When the upgrade cost is positive, RHS is represented as a hyperbola. In this case, LHS still 
intersects RHS from the below just once, under the second part of Assumption 2.2 that upgrade cost 
β  is not prohibitively high (i.e.,  ]).  
1 1 ) (
− − + − < γ ρ ρ β
1: As α  does not affect either LHS or RHS, a change in α  does not change  .  λ
*
2: When the upgrading cost β  increases, the hyperbola RHS shifts away from the origin. Then, the 
intersecting point moves to the right. That is, upgrading interval increases upgrading becomes slower.  
3: When the learning costs become less important (i.e., when γ  becomes bigger), LHS shrinks to the 
left. (See Figure A1.2) Then, the intersecting point moves to the right. That is, upgrading interval 
decreases and upgrading becomes faster. ♦ 
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Proof of Proposition 2.3 
Take differentiation on equation (2.4). The first and second inequalities are trivial. The third one is 
proved as follows.  
  () ( )
λ γ ρ λ γ ρ
γ ρ α ρ λ γ α ρ λ γ
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Consider the following function: 
  .    gx xe
x () ( ) =− +
− 11
g g () ,( ) 00 =∞ = 1 , and   if x > 0. Therefore,  gx x e
x '( )=>
− 0 g x () > 0 if x > 0. 
Therefore, in equation (A1.13),     
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  39Appendix 2. Calculating Total Factor Productivity Growth 
 
Methodology 
  The TFP growth rate indicates how quickly output increases as a result of productivity 
growth after controlling the growth in production factors. Consider the following production function.  
   YF    (A2.1)  K L t tt t = ( , , )
where  : output at time t,  : capital input at time t, and  : labour input at time t.  Yt Kt Lt
Take the differential with respect to time on equation (A2.1) and then divide it by equation (A2.1). As 
a result, we get:  
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In equation (A2.2), the last term,  , represents the TFP growth rate: this term refers to the 
growth rate of output due to the productivity change independent of changes in factor inputs. In other 
words, TFP growth rate can be represented as the following. 
FF t /












K =− − $$ L $
=
 (A2.2’) 
Under the assumption that the factor markets have perfect competition,  
   (A2.3)  pF r pF w KL = ,
where p: output price, r: factor price of capital, and w: factor price of labour. 
The assumption of constant returns to scale makes this production function linearly homogeneous 
with respect to capital and labour. From the properties of linearly homogenous functions,  
  . (A2.4)  KF LF F KL +=
Therefore, under the assumption of perfect competition in the factor markets and constant returns to 
scale, capital income share and labour income share are well defined as follows. 

















≡= = ≡= = + = ,, 1  α α .
         (A2.5) 
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  In growth accounting, the output growth rate subtracted by the weighted average of each 
input’s growth rate (weighted by each inputs income share) is called the “Solow residual.” Equation 
(A2.6) shows that the growth rate for “total factor productivity (TFP)” is equal to the Solow residual 
under the assumption of constant returns to scale and perfect competition in the factor markets. In this 
case, the TFP growth rate can be immediately calculated from output growth rate, input growth rate, 
and factor income share. 
  In order to calculate the TFP growth rate from actual discrete time data, however, we need a 
discrete time version of equation (A2.6). It is well known that the log of the growth rate of total factor 
productivity between time t and time (t-1) can be calculated from the second order translog 
approximation of the production function.
31 That is, 
  ∆∆∆ ∆ ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) TFP Y K L tt K t L ≡− t − α α  (A2.7) 























With this equation, I calculated the TFP growth rate for various aggregation levels from four-digit 
SIC code sub-industry level to country level. I used value added, the value of capital stock, and 
number of employees for Y, K, and L, respectively. In general, the Solow residual as a TFP growth 
rate measure is very vulnerable to noise factors because this measure is basically a residual which 
includes any number of measurement errors. In order to reduce the effects from such noise, I used a 
five-year moving average in calculating both the TFP growth rate and the capital growth rate. 
Data 
 Figure  5 and Figure 6 are drawn using the data from the Quarterly Survey of Corporations 
published by the Ministry of Finance in Japan. This survey covers Japanese corporations with capital 
of no less than 10 million yen. Aggregated numbers for balance sheet items and income statement 
items are reported by industry and by firm size. For the capital series used to calculate the TFP 
growth rate and the capital growth rate, I used the value of tangible fixed assets excluding land and 
                                                      
31   For more detail, see Young [1995] and references there. 
  41construction in process. I reported the annual growth rate while the data is reported quarterly. As with 
all the other values in this section, the growth rates represent the moving average over the last five 
years.  
 In  Figure 7 and Figure 8, I delved into more detailed categories by moving down from 
“general machinery” to “boilers, engines, and turbines” and from “transportation equipment” to 
“motor vehicles and equipment”.  Here, I used the Survey of Manufactures published by the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan. This is the same data that I used for the learning-
by-doing regressions in Section 4.  
 In  Figure 9 and Figure 10, I show the case of comparable US industries. For this purpose, I 
used the Annual Survey of Manufactures published by the US Department of Commerce. This 
particular survey offer numbers for new capital expenditures, but not capital stock.  I constructed the 
capital stock series by using the perpetual inventory method. In constructing the capital stock series, I 
used the Compustat industry aggregation data for bench marking. The same pattern is confirmed in 
the US data as well. 
  Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6 are based on the same data sources for the above figures: 
Quarterly Survey of  Corporations (Ministry of Finance, Japan), Survey of Manufactures (Ministry of 
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